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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1:09-cr-00172-01) 
Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Submitted: September 20, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and O’MALLEY*
 
, Circuit Judges. 






GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Tracy J. Washington (“Washington”) appeals the District Court’s 
November 29, 2011 Judgment and sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment.  Washington 
                                                 
*Hon. Kathleen M. O’Malley, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and to possession of a firearm by a previously 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Washington was sentenced to 240 
months’ imprisonment.  After sentencing, Washington appealed, seeking, among other 
things, the application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to reduce his sentence.  We 
remanded, and at re-sentencing, Washington was sentenced to 188 months’ 
imprisonment.  Washington now contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.  
For the following reasons, we affirm the District Court’s Judgment and sentence.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts.  In May 2009, Washington was charged with possession of five grams or 
more of cocaine base with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
and with possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g).  On June 4, 2010, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Washington 
pled guilty to both counts. 
In its Presentence Report, the Probation Department calculated Washington’s 
Sentencing Guidelines offense level at 34, after applying a reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility and after applying an enhancement because of the career offender 
provision in § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines.1
                                                 
1 This provision applies to a defendant convicted of three or more felony offenses that are 
appropriately characterized as crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses. 
  The PSR’s offense level calculation also 
included a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm by a previously convicted 
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felon, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). 
At the first sentencing hearing on December 29, 2010, Washington objected to the 
four-level enhancement.  The District Court initially overruled the objection but later 
sustained it after hearing further argument; however, the total offense level did not 
change because of the application of the career offender provision of the Guidelines.  The 
District Court imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment, followed by eight years 
of supervised release.  Washington filed a timely appeal.   
During the pendency of his first appeal, the United States Attorney General issued 
a change in the Department of Justice’s policy regarding the retroactive application of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.  Washington had raised the issue of the application of the 
Fair Sentencing Act at his sentencing, and as a result, the Government requested that this 
Court remand the case for re-sentencing under the new policy.  This Court granted the 
request and remanded the case for re-sentencing.   
The District Court conducted the re-sentencing on November 21, 2011.  The 
second Presentence Report calculated Washington’s offense level at 31 with a Guidelines 
range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.  At re-sentencing, the District Court both 
incorporated its findings from the initial sentencing hearing and made new findings about 
Washington’s family history, health, substance abuse problems, participation in 
rehabilitation programs, and the circumstances surrounding the arrest for the underlying 
offense and previous convictions.  The District Court then reduced Washington’s prison 
term from 240 to 188 months’ imprisonment and his term of supervised release from 
eight to six years.  Washington timely appealed. 
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      II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
We review the District Court’s sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364 (2007) (citing United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005)); United States v. Tomko
III. ANALYSIS 
, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 Washington’s arguments appear to be two-fold.  First, Washington argues that the 
directive under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, that a career offender’s sentence should be at or near 
the maximum term authorized, violates United States v. Booker
A. 
 because it makes the 
Guidelines mandatory and inhibits the sentencing court’s ability to treat the Guidelines as 
advisory.  Second, Washington argues that his sentence of 188 months is substantively 
unreasonable and that the District Court abused its discretion by (1) unreasonably 
designating him a career offender, (2) failing to grant a downward variance based on 
Washington’s contention that the career offender designation overrepresented his 
criminal history and based on Washington’s age and participation in multiple post-
sentence rehabilitation programs, and (3) incongruently failing to apply the downward 
variance at re-sentencing that it applied at the initial sentencing hearing.  
 After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Career Offender Provision 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory.  Instead, they are advisory.   
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We have not directly addressed whether Booker also made the career offender provision 
of the Guidelines advisory.2  We have consistently held, however, that in compliance 
with Booker, a district court’s first step in determining a defendant’s sentence must be to 
“calculate the correct guidelines range applicable to a defendant’s particular 
circumstances.”  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on 
other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).  We continue to agree 
and note that a sentencing court must calculate the correct sentence under the Guidelines, 
including, if applicable, the career offender provision under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Here, the 
District Court correctly applied the career offender provision.  Booker
B. 
 was not violated. 
 Washington’s second argument is that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.  
When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, the district court’s decision is 
“accord[ed] great deference.”  
Substantive Unreasonableness 
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 
2007).  In evaluating substantive reasonableness, the appellate court should take into 
account the totality of the circumstances.  United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 218 
(3d Cir. 2009) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  “[T]he touchstone 
of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier
                                                 
2 However, we have addressed this issue previously in a not precedential opinion.  
Nabried v. United States, 199 F. App’x 102 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that 
the career offender provision violates Booker). 
, 
475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
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 Specifically, Washington argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable 
and that the District Court abused its discretion by (1) unreasonably designating him a  
career offender, (2) failing to grant a downward variance based on Washington’s 
contention that the career offender designation overrepresented his criminal history and 
based on Washington’s age and participation in multiple post-sentence rehabilitation 
programs, and (3) incongruently failing to apply a downward variance at re-sentencing as 
it had at Washington’s initial sentencing.  None of these arguments has merit.   
As an initial matter, Washington’s argument that the career offender designation is 
inappropriately applied has no legal foothold.  The Guidelines state that a defendant is a 
career offender if the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the 
underlying offense, the underlying offense is a felony, and the defendant has at least two 
prior felony convictions.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  It is undisputed that Washington satisfies 
all three requirements, and as such, the District Court properly applied this designation.   
Additionally, there is no evidence that the District Court abused its discretion in 
failing to grant a downward variance at re-sentencing.  In explaining a sentence, a district 
court is obligated to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it had] a 
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.”  Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).  The record demonstrates that, at both the initial 
sentencing and re-sentencing, the District Court engaged in meaningful consideration of 
the § 3553(a) factors, including hearing arguments on and addressing the details of 
Washington’s past crimes, as well as his age and participation in post-sentencing 
rehabilitation programs.  See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 218-20 (3d Cir. 
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2010) (requiring a sentencing court to give a reasoned, coherent, and sufficiently 
compelling explanation when granting a downward variance on the basis of a policy 
disagreement with the career offender Guideline).  In fact, the sentence confirms that the 
District Court did
Furthermore, the District Court’s decision to vary downwardly from the first 
calculated Guideline range, and not to vary downwardly from the second calculated 
Guideline range, is well within the District Court’s broad discretion.  Additionally, this 
Court has emphasized that sentences falling within the advisory Guidelines range are 
more likely to be reasonable than those falling outside of that range.  
 consider Washington’s criminal history, age and participation in 
rehabilitation programs, among other factors, because his sentence is at the absolute 
bottom of the applicable advisory guideline range.  Moreover, the fact that the District 
Court sustained Washington’s objection to the four-level firearm possession enhancement 
demonstrates that it considered Washington’s arguments.   
See United States v. 
Olfano
The sentence imposed here is not substantively unreasonable, and the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in rendering this sentence.   
, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).  The final sentence of 188-months’ 
imprisonment is at the low end of the Guidelines range. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we shall affirm the Judgment and sentence of the 
District Court.    
CONCLUSION 
